For a long time, in a very patriotic way, the French thought that they had, if not the best, at least one of the best health care systems in the world. In 1945, when France decided to create a National Health Insurance (NHI) system, the politicians looked for a model across the Rhine rather than across the Channel. The French system was Bismarkian. Compulsory contributions financed health care and the system was controlled, not by parliament but by trade unions and the business community on the one hand and by government on the other. This system has grown to be less and less legitimate, although it has to be remembered that the French 'resistance' who came to power in 1945 understandably scorned a parliament which had voted 5 years earlier to grant full powers to Marechal Petain, It wasn't until 50 years later, that it was finally decided that each year parliament would debate and vote on the level of health care expenditure for the following year.
Patients have direct access to all services and their cost is reimbursed by the NHI system. Patients incur co-payments for ambulatory care. With the exception of public hospitals, doctors are paid on a fee-far-service basis. The existing supply of services is such that there are no waiting lists. Doctors' autonomy was absolute until recently, although they can still establish a practice wherever they want.
The freedom which characterized the French system was, however, limited in two ways. First, to use a bed or certain types of equipment, authorization is necessary. Second, physicians' fees, daily payments related to hospital stays and prices of investigations are set and controlled on a national basis. Most prices are negotiated between professional unions and the insurance system. One third of the physicians, however, opt to join 'Sector 2' which means they can charge patients more than the negotiated fees, provided they pay a higher percentage of social security contributions. Hence, the system has been mainly managed by controlling the means of production, including the number of physicians, prices, and a system of global budgeting for public hospitals.
Why could the system not be sustained?
For 20 years France had a high rate of growth of health care expenditure in real terms (0.3% of GDP per year). Expenditure reimbursed by NHI has, however, dropped from 79% at the end of the 1970s to 73.6% today, compared with a European average of 85%. Concern about the equity of the system is increasing: 20% of the population (10 million inhabitants) is not covered by voluntary private health insurance, which can cover co-payments. Financing has become more regressive because it is the low income groups who are not covered by private insurance.
While the proportion of health care expenditure covered by NHI has declined, contributions have increased. But this has not been enough. The social security system (which covers health insurance and pensions) has been, and still is, running a financial deficit of approximately 30 billion FF per annum (5% of publicly financed health care expenditure). France could devote more than 240 billion FF to other types of consumption if it had the same level of health care expenditure per capita as, for instance, Denmark. A new fund (and a new tax) were created in 1995 to reimburse, over a period of 13 years, the 220 billion FF accumulated debt, 60% of which can be attributed to funding health care and the rest mainly to pensions. By 1996, it was time to pay the price for a 'laisser-faire' approach.
The fact that universal coverage does not result in equity of access to health care is not the only flaw in the system. Health expenditure, using the British RAWP formula, varies 50% between the lowest and the highest regions of the country. The budgets of hospitals with identical case mix vary three-fold, depending on the hospital's history. And the level of physicians' incomes within a medical specialty varies three-fold between the 97 local government 'departments' without any epidemiological or economic explanation.
France has the third highest health care expenditure (10.7% of Gnp) in the world and the highest within the European Union. Yet citizens are in no better health than their counterparts in Germany or Britain, although they face similar demographic changes and use comparable technologies. Child mortality in France is similar to Europe's average. Excess mortality of the French male population gives France the thirteenth rank and the differences in life-expectancy between the north and the south of the country is 3.5 years. The gap between social classes is wide: at the age of 35 years the difference in life-expectancy between the two ends of the social spectrum is 9 years. Fortunately there are a few pieces of good news: life-expectancy is among the highest in the world for the female population, 81.9 years at birth. Mortality from cardiovascular diseases is the lowest in the world, although that has probably more to do with nutritional habits than with the health services.
It was not the inefficiency of the health care system that was the driving force towards reform but rather the growing deficit, which must be reduced if France is to meet the 'Maastricht criteria' to enable entry to the J Health Serv Res Policy Volume 2 Number 4 October 1997 197
European single currency, the Euro, in 1999. It was time to demonstrate that the pit of health care expenditure was not bottomless.
La reform Juppe
As with most important previous reforms (1945, 1958, 1967) , 'la reform juppe', named after the then prime minister, was not voted on by parliament. Given the importance of the medical lobby in the right wing majority that existed at the time and specifically within the Gaullist Party, the government decided to use a specific procedure of the constitution which enabled it to reform the system without debate. The government was afraid that otherwise its proposals would have been altered.
Alanjuppe was praised, in spite ofthe fact that during his campaign for thexpresidency, Jacques Chirac had announced on several' occasions that the principles of the health care system would remain untouched and that the deficit would disappear with economic growth. It did not happen and, not surprisingly, the health professions protested during the spring of 1997. Ironically, in the first ballot for the Presidency 62% of physicians had voted for Chirac, compared with a national average of20%! As the expenses reimbursed by the NHI were limited and the government promised that the level of reimbursement was not going to decrease, total expenditure was at last going to have to be controlled. How was that going to happen?
The control of hospital expenditure
A new body, the Regional Hospitalization Agency (RHA), was created in each of the 23 regions. Its general manager, nominated directly by the government, was given planning control for both public and private hospitals as well as financial power over public and private non-profit hospitals. A national budget covering for-profit hospitals' expenditure had been in force since 1992 and was functioning satisfactorily. The regional budget, allocated by the Ministry of Health, had the aim of reducing regional inequalities. In turn, the RHAs were to reduce intraregional inequalities. Several tools were available, including the use of prices based on diagnosis-related groups. These processes were implemented early in 1997 and led to some protests in spite of the small impact they actually had. The scope for change, however, was limited as public hospital employees are civil servants and cannot be made redundant.
Control of doctors' fees and prescriptions
The system was so complex that few doctors understood it. The approach was that each year a national budget, to cover doctors' fees and prescriptions of drugs, would be decided by the NHI system. In March of the following year, if what was actually spent on fees was higher than what was allowed, the physicians reimbursed the The French reforms: a rich area for health services research excess. If it was lower, physicians' fees would increase in proportion. How did this apply to each doctor? The individual budget allocation depended on whether the doctor was a general practitioner (GP) or specialist, the geographical region, and the annual rate of growth both regionally and nationally. Individual doctors were to be responsible for the level of increase of their fees. In addition, if they exceed their budget for prescriptions they are to be financially responsible for 20% of the over-spend. After 2 months of protests, this rate went down to 5% and in April 1997 it was finally set at 1%1 Both the pharmaceutical industry and the physicians' unions opposed to the reform played a role in this rapid change.
Other aspects of the reforms
A national accreditation procedure was launched which was to start in every hospital by 2001. It was compulsory, unlike in all other developed countries, and controlled by a new agency which would define the norms as well as the specific mechanisms by which each hospital would be controlled.
Each private medical practitioner was to have a personal computer with which to transmit information about patients to the NHI. This information was to be used to reimburse the patients and enable the NHI to produce epidemiological data and initiate managed care. At the beginning of 1997, only 20% of private practitioners were using a computer. In addition, many of the coding procedures were still not defined -and the medical profession are not prepared to accept this.
Finally, the reforms allow the creation of new mechanisms for funding including health maintenance organisations, GP fundholding and capitation payments. This is quite unusual, given the country's centralized, legalistic culture.
While these reforms were to be profound, they remain partial. To highlight just one aspect, they do not favour the integration of health and social care. They are also complex. The authorities in charge of regulation of hospitals are different from those in charge of private practitioners. The lack ofjurisdictional capacity attributed to hospital administration to change the internal structure might also hinder the impact of the reforms. For instance, the chief of every hospital ward is still nominated personally by the Minister of Health and the hospital directors have no power to reduce the number of their employees.
Reaction to the reforms
The reforms were oppposed by the leaders of the medical profession (who 2 years before had considered Chirac the best protection against any form of cost containment), the Communist Party, the left wing union (CGT) and its traditional opponent, the most anti-communist union (FO). Members of the Socialist Party were divided. While officially quite critical, at least two former ministers of health in socialist governments were supportive. Finally, many right wing memb.ers of parliament, while not officially opposed, were pnvately surprised and shocked.
. The future specialists protested and went on stnke. They alleged that patients wouldn't be treated at the end of the financial year if the budget had been exceeded and that, therefore, these financial constraints were incompatible with medical ethics. They also claimed that the system was unable to differentiate between good and bad physicians. They were, in reality, concerned about their future income and used arguments which relied on medical ethics. The support of the French press for the strike was limited and most of the intelligentsia was quite clearly against it. In contrast, the medical press, financed by the pharmaceutical industry, was supportive. Although the drug industry paid a specific tax last year of 2 billion .FF, .it kept a low political profile and was able to mam.~m the existing system of regulation, similar to the Bntls.h one. Although generics are overtly favoured by pubhc policy, support for them is weak and, more generally, managed care is still quite a long way off.
The reforms were, therefore, a paradox. Conceived and applied by a right wing government, they were supported by a trade union (la CFDT) , the largest mutual insurance fund (la Mutualite Francaise) and some experts. Their common characteristic was being on the centre left of the political spectrum.
The reforms were not liberal but bureaucratic. The RHAs, for instance, were to have strong administrative and economic powers. With the exception of the care networks ('reseaux de soins'), no new market mechanisms were introduced.
Although opponents of the reforms advocated financial control based on scientific evidence, they knew that it would be a long while before it could be operational and therefore pretended that a financial cap would lead to rationing. This argument disregarded the level Editorial at which the cap was set: the highest in Europe, and roughly twice as much per inhabitant than it is in Britain.
The 1997 general eledion
In May 1997, a new government was elected, an event that was partly a consequence of reactions to the juppe health care reforms. During the campaign, the successful candidate, Lionel Jospin, and the Socialist Party said little about these issues. They criticised the reforms but did not say if and how they would alter them. They have just announced a forum (Etats generaux) on health policy which is going to take place in January 1998.
Claude Bartolone, the president of the powerful 'Social Commission' in parliament indicated that he would not oppose a financial cap on physicians' fees unless another equally effective mechanism was proposed. He suggested also that the directors of the RHAs might lose some of their independen~e.
. . There is little doubt that financial constramts will continue to influence health policy strongly, as well as the necessary reductions of inequalities between hospitals and regions. Dramatic chan?"e to the .foundations of the juppe reforms seems unhkely. Two Issues will, however, have to be clarified by the new government. The first concerns the extent of the power and responsibility of the regions in devising and implementing future health policy. And the second relates to the possibility of independent and competitive managed care institutions entering the health care system. The next few months should prove of great interest to observers of health care systems and health policy everywhere. There may be new opportunities for health services research.
